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Abstract
The United Kingdom’s (UK) National Health Service (NHS) has a procedure, ‘special measures’, which is used to implement
changes to a Trust when there are concerns about the quality of care being delivered. This case study uses the London
Protocol to analyse how a plethora of factors contributed to an ‘inadequate’ rating and the subsequent initiation of the
special measures procedure at Cambridge University Hospitals (CUH) in September 2015. External factors such as legal and
political reform have a strong influence on healthcare as well as the substantial internal forces within the state-led NHS
including finance, culture and management. Factors specific to CUH also had a significant role to play: the early adoption of a
complete digital record system, costing over £200m, adversely affected CUH Trust at this time and was implicated as a
major factor in its inadequate performance. In addition, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) identified many other
important shortcomings at CUH. The London Protocol is used to bring clarity and structure to the complexities of the
Health Services Industry, both within and surrounding CUH during this period.
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Introduction
In September 2015, Cambridge University Hospitals
(CUH) received an ‘inadequate’ rating from the Care
Quality Commission (CQC),1 resulting in the initiation
of the special measures protocol. The CQC are the reg-
ulatory body of health and social care services in
England. Therefore, they are responsible for recom-
mending to NHS Improvement (previously Monitor)
that an NHS Trust should be put into ‘special measures’.
The ‘special measures’ procedure is implemented when
there are serious concerns regarding the quality of care
being delivered at a Trust. It is designed to offer external
support for improvement when it is believed that the
Trust does not have sufficient management capabilities
to implement the necessary changes within a reasonable
time frame. Interventions typically include the appoint-
ment of an improvement director alongside appropriate
partner organisations, selected for their strength in areas
corresponding to the Trust’s identified weaknesses.
Scrutiny of monthly progress reports against action
plans ensures progress is transparent. Additionally, the
Trust’s board and executive team will be reviewed and if
required, changes will be made.2
CQC report findings
Out of the five broad measures assessed by the CQC,
concerns were raised in four. ‘Effectiveness’ was deemed
to require improvement, whilst ‘Safety’, ‘Responsive’ and
‘Well-led’ were judged inadequate at CUH. Only ‘Caring’
received a positive score; outstanding.1
Principal issues identified by the CQC report included
staffing levels, financial performance, waiting times, use
of IT systems and management concerns.
The 2015 CQC report was not the first sign that there
was concern about the operations at CUH. Around the
time of the appointment of a new CEO, in November
2012, Monitor took regulatory action at CUH.3 Several
issues, such as poor financial performance and failure to
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meet agreed healthcare targets, were common to the
Monitor 20123 and CQC 20151 reports. Therefore,
CUH was aware of these issues but did not, or was
not able to, rectify them in the intervening three years.
The London Protocol
Analysis of the complex, intertwined events that led to
CUH’s decline into special measures is challenging.
Evaluation through a systems-theoretical framework,
the London Protocol,4 will endeavour to bring clarity
to the situation via thorough investigation into the
wide range of contributory factors. The London
Protocol has been widely used to investigate incidents
in the field of healthcare and uses a schemata of seven
sets of factors that influence clinical practice: patient,
task and technology, individual staff, team, work envi-
ronment, organisation and management, and institu-
tional context factors. The factors accumulate as a
series of inter-related layers with bi-directional influence
until the full context of the healthcare setting is realised.
Patient factors
In this scenario, there is not an individual patient with
conventionally attributable factors to analyse, since the
event in question pertains to the overall performance
of CUH as a Trust as opposed to a singular patient
safety event. However, the dual purpose of the CQC to
‘provide patients with safe, effective, compassionate,
high-quality care’ and ‘encourage improvement’ should
not be overlooked. Therefore, one may hypothesise that
the implementation of special measures is to facilitate
this aim.
In the UK healthcare services environment there are a
number of independent thinktanks, research institutions
and charities which also aim to improve the quality and
efficiency of healthcare organisations. One such organi-
sation is The Dr Foster Unit at Imperial College
London. Within the same timeframe as the Monitor
2012 report,3 CUH was awarded the Dr Foster Trust
of the Year5 as well as receiving an accolade for the
quantity of its research6 and European accreditation as
a comprehensive cancer centre.7
The Dr Foster report praised CUH for high efficien-
cy, high quality of care and low mortality rates from
a combination of 13 efficiency indices (readmission
within a week, readmission within 28 days, procedures
with limited clinical effectiveness, short stay admissions
without diagnosis, scheduled operations which were not
performed, use of day case surgery, long-stay elderly
patients, long-stay surgical patients, excess bed days,
outpatient rates of follow up, outpatient rates of atten-
dance, operations not performed at the weekend and
scans available at the weekend) and four mortality
indicators (hospital standardized mortality ratio, sum-
mary hospital-level mortality indicator, deaths after sur-
gery, deaths in low risk conditions).
Although the aims of Dr Foster’s data-based analysis
appear to be aligned with those of the CQC, the conclu-
sions were markedly divergent suggesting incongruency
in the outcomes selected for scrutinisation.
Task and technology factors
Epic. In October 2014, Addenbrooke’s became the first
hospital in England to deploy a fully paperless patient
record system, Epic’s eHospital – which was widely used
in the United States of America (USA) at the time. The
cost to the Trust was substantial at around £200m1
within the context of a typical annual budget of £707m.8
According to the CQC, the Epic IT system for clinical
records had diminished the Trust’s ability to report,
highlight and take action on patient data as well as lim-
iting the correct prescription of medications; mistakes
which could have had serious consequences if left
unchecked.1
Cause for concern regarding Epic was also quickly
identified by the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). Their report
identified issues including insufficient assurance about
nursing care and food in A&E, difficulty matching test
results to patients as well as problems with district nurse
referrals and discharge letters.9 This raised questions of
whether implementing Epic was a mistake, or, if the
Trusts management had not handled the implementation
satisfactorily.
Task design. An additional task factor identified was the
frequent cancellation of routine operations as well as
longer than target waiting times for surgery and outpa-
tient appointments. However, CUH was one of many
Trusts struggling to meet these nationally set waiting
time guidelines. Nationally, in the fiscal year 2014–15,
only 86.2% (target 92%) of patients were seen within the
18weeks mandated for Referral to Treatment (RTT).10
Individual staff factors
CEO. The CEO of CUH in 2015 was a transplant sur-
geon who had worked previously in that specialty at
CUH and at the nearby Royal Papworth Hospital.
However, directly prior to his appointment as CEO of
CUH, he had been working as CEO of Metro North
Health Service, which is one of the largest health service
providers in Australia. His previous experience working
on the ground level at CUH and executive managerial
role at Metro North Health Service made him, on paper,
excellently placed for the position. His unexpected res-
ignation,11 a week prior to the release of the CQC
report1 as well as Sir Mike Richards, the CQC Chief
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Inspector of Hospitals saying that senior management
had ‘lost their grip on some of the basics’12 led to
some national media outlets inculpating him in CUH’s
failure.13
Post-resignation, the CEO publicly denounced the
CQC rating, calling it ‘unfair and unjust’ and asseverat-
ing that the reasons were known only to the CQC; the
implication being that other parties would not come to
the same conclusion when appraising CUH.14
Ten months subsequent to his resignation, he was
appointed as the first Chief Clinical Information
Officer (CCIO) for the NHS15; this is indicative of the
NHS’s belief in his competence despite CUH entering
special measures. It could be speculated that the NHS
felt that he had gained invaluable experience from the
implementation of Epic.
Team factors
Disconnection between clinical divisions and the Trust’s
board was highlighted in the CQC report1 pertaining to
the communication of important information. It was
found that certain fundamental principles such as the
perceived purpose of the hospital were not shared
between the Board and the clinicians diminishing the
team’s ability to function.
Work environmental factors
Staffing. The CQC Report found that perpetual staffing
shortages at CUH led to commonplace use of agency
workers and the movement of employees to unfamiliar
departments. In the Rosie Maternity Unit, the midwife-
to-birth ratio was so low that care guidelines were not
being met. A similar finding was noted in the Intensive
Care Unit.1
Staffing ratios, patient safety, quality of care and
leadership in the NHS were brought to the fore after
the publication of the Francis Report16 in 2013. This
report was commissioned following appalling patient
neglect at Mid Staffordshire Trust and investigated as
to why none of the regulatory organisations had identi-
fied the problems sooner. One of the key recommenda-
tions was that the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (NICE) should use evidence-based tools to
determine staffing needs for the NHS. CUH was not
abiding by these guidelines. However, these recommen-
dations are difficult to fulfil in the context of staff short-
ages and funding constraints.
Furthermore, support systems to protect staff were
deemed insufficient and satisfaction amongst the staff
surveyed was poor.1
Maintenance. High levels of nitrous oxide in the air was
discovered in the Rosie Maternity Unit, repeated expo-
sure to which posed an increased risk of respiratory
problems to staff. Senior managers had allegedly been
aware of this for the last two years but had taken no
discernible action despite this being one of the easier
problems to rectify.1
Organisational and management factors
Hospital aims. CUH has strong ties with the University of
Cambridge and hosts the University’s clinical school. It
is the most significant teaching hospital in the region.
The two key purposes of a teaching hospital are to pro-
vide care to the population and to educate students.
However, it could also be considered to be a district
general hospital (DGH) since it is the major health
care facility in the region with a large number of inten-
sive care beds and A&E facilities. Furthermore, CUH
may be considered a specialist centre given that it
hosts the region’s tertiary transplant and cancer services.
For example, it is one of only four centres in the UK to
offer intestinal transplants.
This led to conflicting priorities for managers since
the three types of hospital serve discordant purposes
and was identified as a cause for concern about commu-
nication between the board and the clinical divisions
with the CEO describing CUH as an academic teaching
hospital and the clinical directors believing it to be a
DGH. There is a different emphasis on resource alloca-
tion between the types of hospital which would create
inter-departmental struggles for managers and there are
likely to be nuances between the most appropriate man-
agement and financing structures.
Management and bureaucracy. Management at CUH spe-
cifically, was identified as problematic by Sir Mike
Richards, the CQC Chief Inspector of Hospitals.12
However, the Rose report,17 conducted to review man-
agement in the NHS, identified that there was an endem-
ic problem throughout the NHS. The report stated that
there was ‘insufficient management and leadership capa-
bility to deal effectively with the scale of the challenges’
associated with the difficulties within the NHS. There
was no career development structure to help clinicians
move into leadership roles. Overall, the review pointed
to the fact that the NHS needs to do more to either
recruit or develop management talent. Additionally at
CUH, unification between the board and clinical divi-
sions was recognised as a concern.1
Bureaucracy has been prominent in the NHS. The
Rose report recognised the burden of data demands by
regulators and proposed rationalisation and harmonisa-
tion of reporting to minimise distracting staff from
patient care. Lord Rose also suggested a clearer system
of rational appraisal implying that he found regulatory
measures to be either ambiguous or not correctly tar-
geted. Education of both the regulatory bodies and the
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healthcare leaders would enable a better understanding
of each other’s goals and a more efficient system.
Financial constraints. The cost of Epic’s eHospital, around
£200m,1 was suggested as a contributory factor to
CUH’s budget deficit.
Institutional context factors
CUH within the NHS. In 2015, CUH was one of 155 NHS
Trusts in the UK. As a small unit in a much larger
healthcare system, CUH was influenced by the culture,
practices and regulations of NHS England which acted
as an overarching guiding body. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to consider the remit of both Trust management
and NHS England, alongside the UK healthcare envi-
ronment’s constraints, when identifying the cause of the
problems identified at CUH.
International regard. The NHS was well regarded interna-
tionally at the time. The Commonwealth Fund ranked
the NHS most highly out of 11 countries on the ability to
access care out-of-hours. The NHS also had the lowest
incidence of medical, medication or lab test errors, the
lowest barriers due to cost, the best sharing of important
patient information between providers and best manage-
ment of chronic care. Therefore, despite flaws in the
system and a lower level of funding relative to GDP
than comparable countries (9.3% compared to 11.6%
in France and 11.3% in Germany), the NHS was pro-
viding a good service.18
Funding. At CUH, the financial deficit was identified to
be an issue.1 However, as elicited by The King’s Fund,19
in 2015–16, over 65% of NHS Trusts were in deficit.
As identified by the NHS themselves in ‘The NHS
belongs to the people: A call to action’ campaign,20 soci-
ety had rising expectations, the population was ageing,
and chronic conditions were becoming increasingly prev-
alent. These factors were causing rising demand and
increased pressure on services that had not been matched
by budget expansion, forcing many Trusts into deficit.
The report suggests that ‘to meet these challenges, the
NHS needs to find new ways of delivering health and
care that are more productive and better suited to what
patients and the public will need in the future.’ Is a fun-
damental rethink of how healthcare in the UK works
required?
Legal and political reform. There were two amendments to
the law pertaining to the structure of healthcare after
2010 that had a considerable impact upon the health
service environment within which CUH operated.
The Health and Social Care Act 201221 changed how
services were commissioned; affecting nearly all aspects
of healthcare. The responsibility for care was decentral-
ised and clinicians were given responsibility for the
health of their local population. It was first time since
the inception of the NHS that this responsibility would
not lie with the Health Secretary, with the aim of
increased motivation and ability at a local level to pre-
vent failings. This focus on devolved care was supported
by the Marmot Review22 which quantified the differen-
ces in health conditions across the UK in number and
severity. The second aim was to increase efficiency and
reduce costs within the existing patient safety regulatory
framework by creating a competitive environment in the
NHS for the first time.
The Care Act 201423 further shaped the social care
environment. This made service provision from local
authorities fairer by setting a national eligibility level
for financial means testing as opposed to the previous
variable regional levels. The changes loosely conformed
to those proposed by the Dilnot report,24 which was
commissioned to examine the fairest and most sustain-
able way to fund social care. Despite the changes, social
care was still posing a major challenge to Hospital Trusts
generally at the time of the CUH CQC report, in partic-
ular hindering patient discharges.
Conclusion
Allocating blame to a specific cause for the failings at
CUH would be near impossible and inaccurate. The
important message to remember when considering the
lesson to be learnt from CUH is the complex multi-
factorial nature of the performance of large scale health-
care organisations; a variety of factors coalesced to
result in the CQC’s inadequate rating of CUH.
The findings detailed by the CQC1 were mostly spe-
cific valid concerns which, if improved, would confer
benefit to patients in the form of higher quality services.
However, there are evidently some complexities sur-
rounding the regulatory criteria since this report and
other critiquing bodies gave vastly differing viewpoints
on CUH. CUH had good outcomes, so one could argue
that inadequate was an inappropriate term to brand
CUH with.
The main factors specific to CUH that could have
contributed to its failure included the decision to imple-
ment Epic which adversely affected patient safety and
finances, its conflicted purpose and the quality of its
leadership. There was much criticism, individually of
the CEO as well as a general disconnection of manage-
ment from clinical divisions that could have contributed
to why the Trust was unable to perform in the UK
health services industry whereas many other Trusts suc-
ceeded in the sense that they were not deemed inade-
quate and did not incur a financial deficit.
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There were factors out of the control of CUH. At a
broader level, the UK healthcare environment contrib-
uted to the problems at CUH in many ways including
the financial constraints, increasing population needs,
poor leadership in the NHS as well as having to adapt
to many politico-legal reforms.
The impact of using the terminology, ‘special meas-
ures’, on the faith that patients place in their health
services and on the morale of the hard-working staff at
the Trust should not be underestimated.
CUH was taken out of special measures in
January 2017.
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